As the introduction to the special issue on Democratisation in Divided Places: Designing Power-Sharing Institution for Broad Inclusion, this article situates the themes, issues, and findings of the issue in a broad disciplinary perspective. Drawing from theories of constitutional design, peacebuilding, democratization, and ethnonational accommodation, the article outlines the tradeoffs that power-sharing faces in war-to-peace transitions and the implications for non-dominant groups. We articulate what we see as a central problem with contemporary power-sharing arrangements, a phenomenon we call the "exclusion amid inclusion" (EAI) dilemma. That is, for power-sharing to create stability and pacify the dominant groups, it must marginalise nondominant groups. These are groups who were neglected in the original design of power-sharing institutions, who remain on the sidelines of postconflict politics, and who face major institutional constraints on their representation and participation in the power-sharing arrangement. Using EAI as an analytical lens, we explain how the articles included in the special issue highlight how different societies have grappled with the question of facilitating broad inclusion in the design of political power-sharing institutions.
Introduction
Over the last three decades, power-sharing has emerged as the dominant model for the governance of societies transitioning from violent conflict. As this special issue demonstrates, some form of power-sharing has been adopted or recommended for settings as diverse as Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Iraq, Lebanon, Fiji, Cyprus, South Africa, and New Caledonia. Whilst this trend in international peace-and state-building has seen peace secured in a number of conflicts previously considered intractable, many leading power-sharing cases have also been beset by political crises that calls into question the functionality of their institutional arrangements. Northern Ireland's power-sharing institutions have been effectively suspended since early 2017; the spectre of an independence referendum for Republika Srpska hangs over the political landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the 2018 parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Iraq served to re-heighten tensions, and; in Cyprus, a UN-supported deal to reunify the island through power-sharing collapsed at the last moment in July 2017.
Consequently, fundamental frictions remain in both the theory and practice of powersharing. Chief amongst these issues is the apparent trade-off between stability and inclusion that power-sharing seems to necessitate. On the one hand, this claim may appear counter-intuitive.
Indeed, the very purpose of power-sharing is to broaden opportunities for entry into government for ethnic minority groups who would be marginalised and excluded under traditional majoritarian processes (Lijphart, 1977) . As such, power-sharing is often considered an inclusive model of governance. Yet, as we demonstrate in this introductory article and in the special issue as a whole, the consociational understanding of inclusion does not go far enough. As a system predicated on the inclusion of the dominant ethnic/ethnonational communities in society, including large ethnic minority groups, power-sharing tends to sacrifice the inclusion of other groups who hold alternative identities beyond the ethnonational divide, including but not restricted to gender, sexuality and class identities. It also tends to limit the representation and participation of very small ethnic minorities, including those that are territorially dispersed as well as internally displaced persons and other migrant communities.
There is some compelling evidence that consociationalism is an important governance strategy for war-to-peace transitions (Noel, 2005; McGarry and O'Leary, 2009; McCulloch, 2014 ). Yet it also establishes a set of political institutions that tend to serve the interests of dominant groups and parties. In so doing, it threatens to close the political space for nondominant groups, thus constraining the prospects of a peace-to-democracy transition. This is the puzzle situated at the centre of this special issue: By explicitly accommodating the interests of some groups, power-sharing systems -at best -implicitly marginalise non-dominant groups orat worst -entirely restrict their representation and participation. The decision to expressly include some groups will result in the exclusion of others; it is also likely to limit the ability of new identity groups to emerge and find representation in power-sharing structures in the future.
We refer to this political phenomenon as the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma.
In the remainder of this article, we elaborate on the nature of the EAI dilemma, its implications for power-sharing theory and practice, and the contributions of the special issue to understanding and resolving the democratic challenge of inclusion/exclusion in power-sharing practice. Specifically, the special issue speaks to three core concerns at the heart of the EAI dilemma: the question of who and what is represented in a consociation, the implications of the institutional inclusion of dominant groups, including large minorities, and the accompanying exclusionary effects of institutional design for the representation of non-dominant groups.
The articles that follow all begin from the position that institutional design processes matter for the democratic accommodation of both dominant and non-dominant groups. They all critically assess the ability of consociational power-sharing to provide for broadly inclusive processes that ensure the inclusion, representation and participation of both dominant and nondominant groups. The authors approach these questions at the level of case study, small-n and large-n comparisons as well as at the thematic and conceptual level. Focusing on the twin questions of who is included and who is excluded in power-sharing enables us to assess the potential for the inclusion of non-dominant groups into power-sharing designs for divided places.
Power-Sharing: Intentions and Institutional Designs
Power-sharing, its advocates argue, is a governance model capable of delivering democracy, stability, and inclusion in deeply divided societies. The way to do so, it is argued, is by distributing political power to the leaderships of both majority and minority groups; alongside this shared rule, each group should also have a degree of self-rule in areas of its primary concern.
Underlying this logic is the belief that elites have the ability to represent the divergent interests and demands of their respective constituencies. Consociationalists advocate for these special arrangements out of a concern that ordinary democratic rules are insufficient for protecting the rights of those who find themselves in a minority position; in divided places, Arend Lijphart (2012) argues, majority rule risks turning into majority dictatorship.
While power-sharing is best considered as an umbrella term to capture a range of institutional strategies that 'allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power ' (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003: 320) , it is most often associated with consociationalism. A consociation is made up of four main institutions. First, the government consists of a grand coalition in cabinet, where dominant groups must be represented in order to ensure government functionality. Each group should also be represented in rough proportion to its share of the population in key sites of governance, including in the legislature, the military, and the civil service. Key political decisions should be taken jointly and subject to cross-community voting rules. These mutual veto rights are intended to safeguard groups' vital interests, those issues which are 'central to the group's well-being, survival and sense of itself' (McCulloch, 2018: 740-1) , thus ensuring their ability to participate on fair terms within government (see, also, Aboultaif, this issue, for how groups are marginalised when they lack veto rights). Finally, groups should also enjoy autonomy provisions; this can be organized either territorially through federal arrangements or non-territorially through cultural autonomy provisions. These four institutions can be implemented in a variety of ways but the most common distinction turns on whether a party's share of power is determined electorally or whether the groups to share power are pre-determined in advance of election results -what is called the liberal-corporate distinction (McGarry and O'Leary, 2007; McCulloch, 2014) .
According to consociationalists, then, the choice is stark: divided societies can choose between 'consociational democracy or no democracy at all' (Lijphart, 1985: 13) . As John McGarry claims, consociationalism 'is the only sort of democracy that can win general acceptance in deeply divided societies ' (2002: 297) . Much of the support for such arrangements relates to consociationalism's inclusive nature of executive decision-making, as well as its legislative guarantees for the main societal groups. John Garry, Neil Matthews and Jonathan Wheatley, for example, commend consociationalism's ability to 'generate a secure and peaceful polity in which all groups are included in decision-making' (Garry, Matthews, and Wheatley, 2017: 493) . Sid Noel suggests: 'power-sharing mechanisms are intended to serve the dual purpose of promoting post-conflict peace building and serving as a foundation for the future growth of democratic institutions' (Noel, 2005: 1) . At a more instrumental level, consociationalism allows former belligerents to save face while foregoing violence by embracing engagement within political institutions in return for real executive power (Garry, Matthews, and Wheatley, 2017: 494) . Thus, power-sharing emphasises the importance of including all conflict parties in government. From this perspective, broad inclusion will facilitate a war-to-peace transition and encourage democratisation by spelling out comprehensive institutional mechanisms for the participation and representation of former conflicting parties in joint decision-making.
Yet it is precisely this collaboration that has led critics to dismiss it as a distinctly elitist form of power-sharing that risks insulating elites from the rest of society. Richard Conley and Charles Dahan assert that putting elites in charge of state stability 'not only may aggravate intergroup tensions but may also be inherently anti-democratic or manipulative' (Conley and Dahan, 2013: 4) . As is argued by Timofey Agarin (this issue), majorities in consociations may be reluctant to broaden the scope of representation for non-dominant minorities. Alternatively, as Andreas Juon (this issue) demonstrates, the mechanisms in place guaranteeing representation for non-dominant groups might ensure but tokenistic participation of these groups in politics.
Similarly, Jon Fraenkel (this issue) illustrates how ethnic hegemons seek to co-opt their opponents into politics while attempting to maintain the pretence of ethnic inclusivity.
Another frequent claim is that consociations become more entrenched as time passes, making it difficult to move to a more 'normal' (i.e., majoritarian) politics. Power-sharing, it is alleged, perpetuates political representation along the lines of the conflict, thereby setting (usually ethnic) groups in opposition to one another. Voters are thus encouraged to support ethnically-framed politics, as the construction of the system ensures that any other choice confers a loss of political power for the ethnic group (Finlay, 2010; Vaughan, 2018: 4) . This discourages the emergence of ideological politics, issue-based politicking, or a shared civic identity (Horowitz, 2001; Finlay, 2010) . By ensuring 'all significant segments' (O'Leary, 2005b: 12) share power and enjoy some level of group autonomy, consociations settle conflict and encourage democratic stability. Yet, as Agarin and Nenad Stojanović suggest in their contributions to the special issue, this makes consociations potentially disinterested in the political status, participation and representation of citizens who do not belong to any of the significant groups, challenging the view that the state belongs to all citizens in equal measure.
Those who come to power through power-sharing are often reluctant to accommodate marginalised or cross-cutting groups, whether micro-minorities, indigenous persons, women, the working class, or other identity groups, since 'many conflicts are not based on these identities and armed groups do not always self-identify along these lines' (Sriram, 2013: 283) . Indeed, power-sharing pacts may 'miss opportunities to build a more inclusive model of postconflict governance' by failing to recognise and emphasise social divisions and identities unrelated to ethnicity (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012: 566) . How, then, does the EAI dilemma affect dominant and non-dominant communities? Are non-dominant groups necessarily 'casualties' of the EAI dilemma or can power-sharing arrangements be designed in such a way as to alleviate exclusions?
Exclusion-amid-Inclusion: What's at Stake?
With these questions in mind, we turn to the implications of the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma. The EAI dilemma, whereby the institutional inclusion of some groups also entails the exclusion of others, emerges from two foundational assumptions in power-sharing theory. The first is that the ethnic divide should and does capture all, or at least the vast majority of, citizens in a divided society. As a result, research on consociationalism suffers from a 'selection bias' (Nagle 2016, 186) : it sees all politics as ethnic politics. When this is assumed to be the case, the interests of those who seek participation and representation on a basis other than ethnicity seem less important to voters and to party leaders than the ethnic divide. Yet, we also know that ethnicity is not the only way citizens constitute their social reality. Even in divided places, it is sometimes not even the most salient aspect of one's identity (Horowitz, 2001) . As Cera Murtagh (this issue) demonstrates, political party mobilisation takes numerous forms under power-sharing rules, including multi-ethnic, cross-ethnic, post-ethnic, and non-ethnic configurations. Civicminded parties also find ways to work, and even thrive, within power-sharing systems, exhibiting their own agency.
The second assumption is that political stability requires the accommodation of parties and groups with the capability to destabilise the system. On the one hand, this is intuitiveinclusion gives such parties a stake in the system, incentivising their support and cooperation with other parties; exclusion, by contrast, offers no such incentives, thus encouraging instability.
On the other hand, however, if destabilising potential is the primary basis by which a group is able to qualify for inclusion, then those who do not possess this potential are marked for exclusion. As McGarry and O'Leary (2017: 67) note, 'the inclusion of all sizeable parties which cross the relevant threshold may well strengthen stability by giving these parties a stake in the system, and parties with support below this threshold are arguably less capable of disrupting the political system'. This threatens to omit a whole range of actors who merit inclusion because of their membership in the citizenry and because they are equally affected by political instability.
That is, they should be included because they too have a stake in the system. Consociationalism, after all, purports to be a democratic model of governance, one for which 'there is nothing in consociational democracy that people who are both consociationalists and democrats have to be apologetic about' (Lijphart, 1985: 12) . There is, moreover, no stability-related reason not to include such groups. If they are unable to destabilise the system from outside, they are thus also unlikely to be able to destabilise it from within. As Charis Psaltis, Huseyin Cakal, Işık Kuşçu and Neophytos Loizides demonstrate in their article for the special issue on the role of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Cyprus peace process, including previously-excluded groups may actually make a positive difference by lending new support to the power-sharing agreement.
In compiling this special issue, we asked the contributors to apply the concept of exclusion-amid-inclusion to their respects areas of research. Three themes quickly emerged. The Together, the special issue as a whole demonstrates that while power-sharing may be an effective governance mechanism to facilitate war-to-peace transitions, it requires on-going reform in order to attain its desired effect of bringing about consensus-driven, issue-based politics, rather than entrenching identity-focused politics. In the remainder of this article, we turn to how the authors confront the special issue's three main themes.
Who and What is Represented in a Consociation?
At an etymological level, a consociation refers to 'a society of societies, or a people of peoples' (O'Leary, 2005a: xxii) . It is for this reason that many consociationalists prefer the adage divided places rather than divided societies -in a consociation, the state is always composed of more than one society. From this starting point, power-sharing advocates contend that the transition from war-to-peace has to commence with addressing the substantive concerns of conflict protagonists -or the different peoples in the state -in order to pave the way for peace and democratisation. Such an arrangement is, at a minimum, better than continued intergroup violence and is thus preferable to other institutional solutions. A 'negotiated consociational Nenad Stojanović picks up directly on the notion of a 'people of peoples' by aligning consociational democracy with the literature on demoi-cracy, which also assumes 'a Union of peoples who govern together but not as one' (Nicolaïdis, 2013: 351) . While most theorists distinguish between demoi-cracy and consociational democracy, Stojanović identifies some considerable conceptual affinity. His concern is with whether the design of political institutions around competing demoi favors stability over democracy. Ultimately, Stojanović concludes that a (corporate) consociational democracy is 'a conceptual impossibility'. The demos problem is 'solved' in one of two ways in a consociation: either by falling into the 'ethnocracy trap' whereby democracy becomes untenable or by the integration of competing demoi into a single demos, at which point governance is democratic but no longer consociational. A consociation becomes either a more extreme version of ethnic identity politics, as seen in ethnocracies, or it is rendered obsolete if and when ethnic politics yield place to the kind of interest-based politics found in demoicracies and other multinational liberal democracies.
Both articles suggests at the very least, that consociations are resistant to reform because the groups reaping the power-sharing dividend are mindful that their interests are recognised by and vested in the system. According to both authors, as long as power is shared between ethnic groups, consociations appear similar to ethnocracies in their functional modality of 'government or rule by a particular ethnic group' (Anderson, 2016) , or indeed several ethnic groups. As a result, the members of the political community who do not belong to any one of these segments are factually reduced to second-order partners in political decision-making. While it is possible for a consociation to 'render itself superfluous' (Lijphart, 1977) , a process Stojanović argues has happened in the early consociational cases of Switzerland and Austria, more often than not it morphs into ethnocratic form, with Bosnia and Herzegovina as the prototypical example. In such cases, consociational institutions, particularly corporate ones, do not become superfluous but instead entrench divisions. As Stojanović demonstrates, direct democracy and other centripetal strategies may be able to contribute to the emergence of a shared identity of peoples as citizens of the same polity. Agarin meanwhile argues that this process is likely to result in the overrepresentation of a newly constituted majority and, as is the case in liberal democracies, its eventual domination over all other non-dominant groups in the citizenry. Agarin and Stojanović, then, in line with the other authors in the special issue, stress the implications of the pathdependent nature of power-sharing institutions, particularly as it relates to how non-dominant groups can participate and gain representation in consociational spaces.
Exclusions in Exclusion-amid-Inclusion
The second set of articles challenges the assumption that all citizens seek political representation on ethnic terms. Where politics rely on ethnopolitical bargaining, gender and sexual minorities, micro-minorities, members of groups identifying around non-ethnic or civic labels all find it disproportionally difficult to mobilise around issues that cut across the politically salient group boundaries. Yet, the question of ensuring the political participation of these non-dominant groups is critically important when designing political institutions. In postconflict settings, the exclusion of such groups can result in the limited acceptance of shared interests, identities and institutions, can prevent conflict resolution by pitting the winners and losers of peace-building against one another, and can curtail the consolidation of democratic principles, all of which threatens to impede the peace-to-democracy transition. This concern is taken up by McCulloch, Byrne, Murtagh and Juon who each, in highlighting particular manifestations of exclusion, also identify strategies for minimizing the effects of that exclusion.
Both Allison McCulloch and Siobhan Byrne, for instance, consider how women as a constituency have been largely excluded from power-sharing arrangements. While they chart different strategies for minimizing the EAI dilemma for women, both authors challenge the view that a gender perspective is necessarily at odds with power-sharing practices. Whereas much feminist scholarship tends to frame power-sharing as gender-blind and exclusionary of women's interests, McCulloch and Byrne both worry that a blanket rejection of power-sharing risks leaving women without the tools needed to challenge their exclusion. McCulloch suggests that the resources for integrating a gender perspective can be found within contemporary developments in power-sharing theory practice. In particular, she notes that the widening of Liberal rules enable civic parties to participate on civic terms whereas corporate rules require creative navigation, including sometimes having to act as ethnic representatives in order to gain entry into the system.
Andreas Juon similarly argues that the distinction between liberal and corporate rules has important implications, though he comes at the EAI problem from the perspective of microminorities, ethnic groups that make up but a fraction of the overall population. In a large-N study, Juon uncovers a positive outcome for both dominant minorities and micro-minorities under power-sharing rules. Yet, as he suggests, these findings presents constitutional designers with a quandary: opt for corporate rules, thereby ensuring strong guarantees for a small number of groups, possibly promoting some groups at the expense of others or go with liberal rules, which offer weaker provisions but do so for a wider number of groups. While Juon points to a possible remedy of the EAI dilemma, at least for excluded ethnic groups, it is not likely to be popular with dominant parties, who may want to lock in their share of power via corporate rules.
Consociational theory assumes that because 'ethnic divisions are resilient rather than rapidly biodegradable' (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995: 338) , conflict management is best achieved through the direct political accommodation of the central segments of society. Whilst pragmatic, it leaves open the door to the adoption of corporate over liberal mechanisms for groups' representation. However, corporate consociations establish a system of representation that reserves place in politics to groups ahead of the political participation of the electorate, in so doing projecting interests upon groups, rather than upon members. At the same time, consociations emphasise the value of, and help to facilitate, free and fair elections. If, as liberal consociations do, no seats or government offices are reserved for specific groups ahead of elections, one might be able to reasonably anticipate that the political salience of major ethnic electoral blocs could disappear or weaken after extended periods of political stability. Should voters be more supportive of candidates who articulate their interests, rather proffering (only) identity group rhetoric, consociational politics could equally advance issues that crosscut cleavages and appeal to non-dominant identity groups.
Inclusions in Exclusion-amid-Inclusion
The three final articles in the special issue turn the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma around to analyse the challenges that exist for dominant minority groups when they enter into powersharing arrangements with majority groups. That is, despite their formal inclusion, exclusionary practices may well persist for dominant minorities. Dominant minorities, then, experience their own kind of EAI dilemma.
The central argument presented by Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif is that without careful constitutional design, power-sharing is not always sufficient to overcome the tendency towards hegemonic control. First, the balance of power that exists between groups is likely to skew negotiations in favour of the majority; without strong institutions, such as veto rights, the system will struggle to ward off this tendency to control. This has been the case in Lebanon, with the Christian Maronites historically serving as the hegemon even prior to independence (Winslow, 2012: 65) . This led to the under-representation of the dominant Muslim minority during the National Pact era, which arguably precipitated the civil war (Salamey, 2013: 56) and which was only partially rectified by the terms of the 1989 Taif Accords. Aboultaif speaks to two aspects of Lijphart's original conceptualisation of consociationalism. While he confirms that all four institutions need to be adopted as a package in order to achieve stability -a point from which First, drawing on new survey data collected shortly after the failed Crans-Montana talks in 2017, they find that, contra the extant literature on refugees and conflict resolution, IDP status in Cyprus is associated with higher levels of support for the peace process. Second, their survey data also demonstrate the importance of getting the institutional proposals right. Even when support for general principles of power-sharing is forthcoming, as in a bicommunal, bizonal federation, this does not automatically extend to support for specific institutional recommendations, as reservations on the proposed presidential arrangement indicate.
Consociational theory posits that the war-to-peace transition will eventually be followed by a peace-to-democracy transition. As this happens, the relevance of sectarian identities should dissipate and yield place to cooperative interest-based politics. The central thrust of consociationalism is thus to strengthen the authority of the state, while integrating all those who have input into and benefit from the development of a shared polity into the decision-making process. Yet, as Murtagh, Aboultaif and Fraenkel suggest, political cooperation in many deeply divided places often contests, rather than upholds, the ability of policy instruments to reach across the divide and shape meaningful narratives of social and political change without references to the group identities to be represented in consociational politics. If, as Psaltis et al argue, resolving protracted conflicts is done in the name of 'the people', the representatives of all affected groups should be involved in the political process. To this end, consociational institutions should seek to demonstrate that group identity markers, rather than being permanently fixed, can contribute to and reflect the growth of shared interests, which can -and should -speak to all groups -and individuals -affected by the peace-to-democracy transition.
Conclusion
The question of how to ensure broad inclusion when designing power-sharing institutions is an important one for the development of democratic politics in divided societies. The special issue shines a light on a pressing -if neglected -aspect of this project, what we have labelled the 'exclusion-amid-inclusion' dilemma. The EAI dilemma, which manifests as a by-product of privileging large ethnic groups in power-sharing, risks leaving non-dominant communities out in the cold. In the articles that follow, the authors assess different features of the EAI dilemma, including how to determine who is represented in a consociational democracy, how excluded groups can and do mobilise for greater inclusion, and how exclusionary moments may be challenged amid formal inclusion.
The special issue as a whole suggests that while there is no single solution to the EAI dilemma, there are several points that ought to be heeded by constitutional designers interested in broad inclusion, as a mechanism for both initial peace building and sustainable democratisation.
First, the EAI dilemma needs to be accounted for at the design stage, as it is here that the vision of a postconflict democratic politics is set out. If consociationalism can really render itself superfluous, as Lijphart (1977) claims, it needs to plan for that eventuality by building institutions that can facilitate not just the initial war-to-peace transition but also a peace-todemocracy transition. Second, there is the need to be mindful of the EAI dilemma during powersharing implementation. Power-sharing arrangements should avoid freezing identities salient at any given moment in time -particularly those moments where relations are most divisive. They should be able to leave open the political space for new identities and new interests to emerge and gain political resonance over time; as the authors suggest, the liberal-corporate distinction in power-sharing institutions plays an important role here for understanding the conditions under which the transition from identity-to interest-based politics can begin. Ultimately, power-sharing institutions designed to respond to and minimise the EAI dilemma can help divided places take the much-needed step from war to peace and from peace to democracy.
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